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ABSTRACT
The degree of internationalizaton of the enterprise or business Sectors
of many countries, as measured by the ratio of direct investment abroad to
domestic wealth or assets, or of assets or employment abroad to that at home,
has been growing over the last twenty years or more. The exception to this
trend is the United States, in which the extent of internationalization, after
growing until the 1970s, has stagnated or decreased somewhat.
The level of internationalization of U.S. firms in the 1970s and 1980s was
above that of Germany and especially above those of Japan and Korea. Canada
was close to the U.S. and UK firms were by far the most internationalized.
The differences among the country levels and trends seem to reflect country
size and divergences between the competitiveness of countries and of their
companies, including those that result from exchange—rate movements.
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IKE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PRODUCTION
The steady stream of news about acquisitions, mergers, and joint ventures
across international borders suggests that firms operating in more than one
country are coming to control more and more of the world's trade, production,
investment, and employment. This paper asks whether there is such a trend. Do
the reports represent simply the rapid growth of certain large firms or firms
prom a few countries, or do they represent a widespread shift toward inter-
nationalization in which •1ore and more of the production by firms based in
each country is carried out in other countries?
There is now a large literature on the factors that cause individual
firms from one country to invest in production in other countries. A necessary
condition for such investment is that the investing, or parent, firm possess
some firm-specific advantages that enable it to operate in foreign countries
where local firms have the advantages of better knowledge of consumer and fac-
tor markets, the favor of local governments, and possibly of consumers as
well. While these firm—specific assets are a necessary condition for direct
investment, they are not a sufficient condition; if trade were free, a company
might exploit ts advantages by exporting to each market. There must be some
rewards that tempt firms to produce outside their home countries.
The literature on direct investment provides a variety of explanations
for international production. Many answers may be needed because there may be
many motivations, varying with the firm involved, the industry, the home
country, and the host country, and the time at which the decision is made.
One extreme case is an industry in which trade is impossible. That could
be because of the bulkiness of the product, the difficulty or expense of
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moving it from one place to another, or legal or institutional requirements.
This case is probably most characteristic of service industries and public
utilities. A railroad or retail electric utility must produce in a country to
sell there. Other examples are construction, retailing, hotels, and other con-
sumer services.
A sore common case is that in which trade can take place, but local pro-
duction is the cheapest, or most efficient, or most profitable way of serving
a market even though it could be served by exporting from the home country.
The advantage of local production might be a reduction in transport or tarff
costs to that market. Automobile assembly in a market, as compared ith the
export of Fully-assembled cars, is an example that involves savings on
transport cost and, in many markets, the evasion of tariffs or other restrc—
tions.
A third case is that in which a host country is the cheapest location Fo
production to serve the world market, sometimes including the home market.
Primary production, where the abundance and cheapness of natural resources is
the attraction, has historically been the major example. Within manufacturing,
there is the example of semiconductor assembly in Southeast Asia, where the
low cost of labor has been crucial.
Finally, there is the situation in which a firm can expand its market in
a country by producing there, as opposed to exporting to it from the home
base. One reason might be that for certain types of products, particularly
complex or intricate ones for which after-sales service, consulting, and
advice are important, the implicit assurance of the firm's continued presence
in the market is an important selling point. A commitment to distribution
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facilities in a country -is probably more convincing in this respect than
selling through agents, and a commitment to complete production in a country
more convincing than distribution facilities. It is said that buyers of
complex machinery often prefer to buy from sellers producing in their
countries for these reasons. A production facility in a country nay also gain
for the firm the advantage of familiarizing local buyers with the firm's name
and reputation, so that production of one product n a host country may
increase the demand there for other products of the same firm, even imported
products.
While these could all be described as factors pulling firms away from
their home bases, there also may be forces originating at home that push them
to foreign production if they possess firm—specific advantages. For example,
Swedish multinationals in the clothing and textile industries shifted some
production even for the Swedish market to Portugal and other low-wage
countries, especially during the 1960s and early 1970s, as Swedish wages
became too high For hose production in this industry (Swedenborg, 1982, pp.
81, 101, 283-286, 290). There were many reports oF U.S. firms shifting produc-
tion to Foreign locations when the exchange value of the dollar made produc—
tion in the U.S. too expensive and uncompetitive. And recently there have been
reported cases of Japanese firms shifting their production to lower-cost Asian
countries to mitigate the effects of the large rise in the exchange value of
the Yen. Thus, an increase in the extent to which a country's firms produce
abroad could reflect a gain in the competitiveness of the country's firms, but
it could also reflect a loss in the competitiveness of the country itself as a
location for production.
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Another influence on the extent of internationalization of a country's
enterprises is the oomposition of the country's produotion and shifts in it.
Although data are fragmentary, there is evidenoe that service industries have
typioally been less international in their operation than primary produotion
or manufacturing industriea. That nay be a consequenoe of the higher degree of
national regulation in service industries but may also represent a greater
degree of difficulty in these industries in transferring a company's com-
petitive advantages from one location to another (Lipsey, 1987, p. 54)
Whatever the reason, the result may be that the extent of nternationalizaticn
tends to be reduced by the worldwide growth in the importance of service
industries. An offsetting influence is the increasing degree of direct invest-
ment within the service industries (United Nations, 1988, Chapters XXI-XXII).
The prcportion of most countries' direct investment abroad that is in these
industries has been rising substantially.
It is not obvious what measure of internationalization would be most
informative. There are data for individual firms in the United States and in
a few other countries on the proportions of their sales and assets in foreign
operations, but they are usually confined to samples of the largest firms and
give no indication of changes in the importance in the economy of the
reporting firms or their shares in overseas activity. They also suffer from
inconsistencies in the extent of consolidation in company reporting end in
accounting for intrafirm transactions. Although these data are not without
interest, we have chosen to concentrate on internationalization measures that
consist of ratios of foreign to domestic activity of a country's firms or a
country as a whole.
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In the internationalization measures we have chosen, the numerators are
the amounts of direct investment or the size of direct investment operatons
in terms of assets or employment. We prefer the asset or employment measures
because they come closer to reflecting the amount of economic activity con-
ducted abroad by affiliates controlled by parents based in a home country.
Value added or output would be the best measures but are not available.
However, we sometimes can produce measures for assets or employment, and we
use them when we can. Unfortunately, we must often rely, especially for long
time series, on measures of the amount of direct investment or what is called
the 'direct investment position," which is a calculation of the amount of
investment by parent companies in the form of holdings of equity or debt. it
tends to underestimate the level of activity because it omits, for example,
the activity financed by local or other lenders. Furthermore, in the case of
the United States, at least, the trends are very different for the different
internationalization measures, and the direct investment posit-ion is biased
downward relative to the other measures.
The denominators are, preferably, aggregate measures for each economy of
total corporate or enterprise assets or of employment or national wealth. The
ratios are affected by such characteristics of a country as the share of cor-
porations in total wealth, as compared with households, governments, and non-
corporate enterprise. We would, ideally, like to compare across countries the
extent of internationalization and changes in it for the economy as a whole
and for the enterprise and corporate sectors. That is only possible to a very
limited extent because of the lack of comparable numerators and denominators
among countries. We have focussed, therefore, on changes within countries in
—6—
whatever internationalization measures are available for each one. However,
we do later summarize the very limited comparisons we can make across
countries for recent years.
Trends in the Internationalization of U.S. Firms
The Beginnings of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad
The U.S. has been unique among the major investing countries in that the
principal form o' its investment has been, from the earliest times recorded,
direct rather than portfolio investment. That •is, it has typically involved
control of foreign operations rather than simply the lending of capital to
foreign—controlled firms or to governments. The earliest estimates, for 1897,
show over 90 per cent of U.S. investment to have been of this type.
Share (per cent) of Direct Investment in
Stock of U.S. Long-term Investment Abroad
1897 .92.7
1908 65.0
1914 75.5
Source: Lewis (1938), p. 605.
The earliest examples of U.S. direct investment took place while the U.S.
was still, on net balance, an importer of capital. They illustrate the key
role of the export of technology, or other firm—specific assets, as contrasted
to the pure export of capital, as is the case with portfolio investment.
U.S. direct investment abroad, in the sense of production abroad by sub-
sidiaries or branches of U.S. companies, began soon after the Civil War and
involved companies '. . . with national sales plans and unique products . . .
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(Wilkins 1970, p. 35). Wilkins describes Singer, the manufacturer of sewing
machines, as ". . . the first American international business (p. 37), with
salaried sales representatives abroad in the early 1860s and its first foreign
factory by the late 1860s (p. 42). Other early American production abroad
during the period when the U.S. was still a capital importer was by Hoe
(printing presses), Babcock and Wflcox (boilers), International Bell Telephone
and Western Electric, Edison Electric, Thomson—Houston Electric, a component
of General Electric when it was formed later, Westinghouse Air Brake, Kodak,
McCormick, Worthington Pump, Chicago Pneumatic Tool, Otis Elevator, National
Cash Register, and Libbey—Owens (Southard, 1931; Wilkins, 1970). These com-
panies were typically early technological leaders in their fields. Another
indication of the importance of technology rather than capital is the number
of instances in which the parent's investment consisted entirely or largely of
patent-rights, as in the case of Ford n Canada, Libbey-Owens Glass in various
European countries, and Westinghouse Electric in the U.K. (Lewis, 1938,
pp. 300-301).
A rough indication of the importance of U.S. direct investment abroad in
these years is that the stock of investment of 1897 was about 3/4 of 1 per
cent of 1900 national wealth, and the investment stocks of 1908 and 1914 were
about 1 per cent and 1 1/2 per cent, respectively, of 1912 national wealth
(U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975, Series F 422).
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The Two World Wars and the Interwar Period
The growth of U.S. direct investment from the beginning of World War
through the end of World War II is summarized in the following figures:
Stock of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad
($ million current prices)
1950 11,800
1945 8,400
1940 7,300
1935 7,219 7,800
1931 8,100
1930 8,000
1929 7,553
1927 5,500
1924 5,389
1919 3,880
1914 2,552 h
5Lewis (1938), pp. 447, 450, and 605
bU.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), Series U29
In relation to U.S. national wealth, this foreign investment grew
slightly until 1929, or possibly the early 1930s, to perhaps 1 3/4 per cent,
but fell back to less than 1 1/2 per cent by the end of WorId War and cThse
to 1 per cent by 1950.
Since most of direct investment is corporate investment, it may be more
revealing to compare its size to a measure of corporate wealth, such as total
corporate assets, as we can do after the mid-1920s.
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Stock of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad
as Percent of Total Corporate Assets
1950 2.D
1945 1.9
1940 1.8
1935 2.6
1930 2.4
1927 2.3
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), Series U29 and V109
Thus, what appeared to be a trend toward increasing internationalization of
U.S. companies up until 1929 or so was reversed by the Great Depression and
World War II, and the late 1940s found U.S. direct investment abroad con-
siderably smaller relative to total U.S. wealth and U.S. corporate assets than
during the 1320s.
The late 1920s were exceptional in the history of U.S. direct investment
in that nvestment in foreign public utilities, which represented only 4 per
cent of the stock of direct investment in 1924, accounted for over a third of
the increase during the next five years. In fact, almost the whole history of
U.S. direct investment in foreign public utilities is concentrated in the few
years between 1924 and 1929. The increase in the stock of public utility
investment in these years was almost 80 per cent of the 1929 total as compared
with less than 30 per cent for all industries combined )Lipsey, 1987).
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Growth in Value of the Stock of U.S. Direct Investment,
1924 to 1929, as Per Cent of the 1929 Stock,
by Industry
1929 minus 1924 as
Per Cent of 1929
Primary Production, excl. petroleum distrib. 19.9
Manufacturing 31.2
Public Utilities 78.2
Distribution mci. petroleum distrib. 18.1
Other 3.5
Total 28.7
Source: Lewis (1938), pp. 450 and 605.
The reasons for this concentrated burst of direct investment in utilities
are worth noting. The two U.S. companies that were the ultisate parents of
most of the utility affiliates were major manufacturers of the capital goods
purchased by the utilities. Neither one operated utilities in the U.S. The
ownership of foreign utilities was, in effect, a way of exploiting the
parents' advantages in technology and marketing in the telephone and electric
power equipment manufacturing 4ndustries.
The Growth of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad After World War II
Whatever technological leads over firms in other countries that U.S.
firms possessed before World War II must have been greatly enlarged by the
relatively favorable environment the U.S. companies enjoyed during and imme-
diately after the war. It is therefore not surprising that after 1950, the
growth of U.S. direct investment abroad, slowed by the Great Depression and
World War II, resumed its rise and did so at a rapid pace. One measure of the
spread of U.S. firms, the number of new affiliates established, rose rapidly
from low levels immediately after the war to a peak in the late 1960s, and
then slowed down.
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Number of New Foreign Affiliates Established
per Year by U.S. Parent Firms
187 Parents 180 Parents
1975 376
1974 619
1973 693
1972 646
1971 905
1970 853
1969 945
1968 1,006
1967 503 912
1966 622 669
1965 714
1964 714
1963 696
1962 596
1960—61 612
1958—59 414
1956—57 316
1954-55 249
1951—53 193
1946-50 107
Source: Vaupel and Curhan (1969), P. 122; Curhan, Davidson, and Sur
(1977), p. 19.
These data are confined to fixed groups of corporations that had become
mutinatonai by the time the sample was selected, and the decine in the rate
oF establishment could have represented nothing more than the exhaustion of
profitable locations for new affiliates by these particular groups of parents.
Furthermore, the data take no account of the size of the newly established
affiliates or of their growth after establishment.
A measure of the internationalization of U.S. firms as a group is the
ratio of foreign direct investment to domestic corporate assets. The value of
foreign direct investment is measured as the book value of parent investment
in affiliates as reported on the books of affiliates. In Table 1 we compare
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the value of direct investment in foreign countries with two estimates of the
total assets of U.S. corporations. One of these is based on U.S. Department of
Commerce calculations of the current value of fixed capital owned by cor-
porations and the Federal Reserve Board's figures for financial assets of cor-
porations, but omitting inventories. The second is a comprehensive asset
measure from book values reported on tax returns. The second measure is pro-
bably inferior as an indicator of corporate wealth but may be more comparable
to the book values reported in the foreign investment surveys.
The peak importance of direct investment abroad relative to all U.S. cor-
porate assets--a little over 3 per cent--came somewhere between the mid-1960s
and the mid—1970s. However, the year—to—year fluctuations and the weakness of
the estimates for years in between surveys make it difficult to identify a
precise peak. whatever the date of the peak, there had apparently been little
change by 1980. The level of internationalization at that pont appeared to be
close to the peak level. By the time of the 1982 survey, both measures showed
a considerable decrease in internationalization, and that continued through
1985 before reversing in the next two years.
Foreign investment was always less important in finance than in other
industries, and the ratio for all industries is greatly affected by the inclu-
sion of financial corporations. Overseas investment was a much higher propor-
tion of the assets of nonfinancial corporations than of those of financial
corporations or all corporations, but the time pattern appears to have been
similar. There was a peak at some point between 1966 and 1973, some decline
through the 1970s, a very sharp drop during the first half of the 1980s to the
levels of the 1950s, and then a couple of years in which the ratio increased
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again.
The amount of investment relative to assets is only one of several
possible measures of the international activities of U.S. firms. It is the one
that can be carried back the furthest, but it has several drawbacks. At best
it measures the financial stake in overseas affilitates, but it does not
reflect the level of activity carried on there. U.S. firms could be increasing
the share of production they carry on abroad or the share of their employment
abroad while -educing their investment in foreign affiliates and still
retaining control of them. More serious problems of measurement arise from the
fact that the nvestment in foreign affiliates is measured in book values
rather than current values and that these are subject to the vagaries of
currency translation. The tangible assets of all U.S. firms, in the denomina-
tor of the ratio, are estimated current values. The high inflation rates of
the late 1970s and early 1980s must have raised the totals for U.S. firms'
assets relative to the values on the books of affiliates. The rise in the
value of the dollar from 1980 through 1984 must have had a similar effect. The
rapidity of the decline in direct investment relative to corporate assets in
the 1980s suggests the influence of the rise in the exchange value of the
dollar.
A financial measure that comes closer to representing the size of
U.S.-controlled overseas operations, rather than only the extent of U.S.
investment in them, is the ratio of overseas assets to the domestic assets of
corporations. It is available only for the survey years and confirms the
results from the longer direct investment series that there was a peak, among
survey years, in 1977, and a decline from that date to 1982.
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Assets of U.S-Owned Affiliates as
Per Cent of U.S. Corporate Assets
All Non-Financial
Industries Industries
U.S. Corporation Assets from
BEA & FRB IRS BEA & FRB IRS
1986 15.7
1985 NA NA 14.9 NA
1984 NA NA 14.4 NA
1983 NA NA 15.5 12.2
1982 15.9 15.8 16.6 13.5
1977 16.9 15.6 20.3 16.8
1966 7.61 6.99 14.8 12.3
1957 5.25 4.84 9.57 8.91
1950 NA NA 7.00 6.28
Source: Appendix Tables U—i and U—3
However, there is a major difference in the pattern shown by this measure. The
degree of internationalization as represented here did not recede to anytHng
close to the level f the 950s. For industries other than finance, the ratio
in 1986 was more than twice that of 1950 and above those of 1983 and 1984.
For all industries, the data are less complete, but the 1982 ratio of direct-
investment assets to total corporate assets was still, in 1982, more than
three times the 1957 ratio. The difference between the movement of the direct
investment/corporate assets ratio and the direct investment assets/corporate
assets ratio points to the fact that U.S. corporations were controlling
foreign assets overseas with much lower levels of investment per dollar of
assets in the 1980s than in the 1950s.
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Direct Investment Position as
Per Cent of Affiliate assets
All Industries Nonfinancial
1986 30.3
1985 NA 30.9
1984 NA 31.8
1983 NA 31.1
1982 15.4 30.3
1977 17.6 35.3
1966 40.2 46.0
1957 52.3 58.5
1950 NA 62.6
Source: Appendix Tables U—i and U—2
The decline was largest for the all-industry total because the ratio of direct
investment to assets is so low for the increasingly important finance sector,
particularly banks. However, the phenomenon was present in the non-financial
sector also, where the direct investment position fell from over 60 per cent
to about 30 per cent of affiliate assets.
A measure free of the effects of inflation and exchange rate fluctuations
is provided by data on employment.
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Employment in Foreign Affiliates as Per Cent of
U.S. Private Sector Non-Agricultural Employment
All Affiliates Majority—Owned Affiliates
Non- Non-
Total Nonbanka Financial Total Nonbank Financial
1986 7.6 8.0 5.7 6.0
1985 7.9 6.4 5.9 6.3
1984 8.2 8.6 6.2 6.5
1983 8.6 9.1 6.5 6.9
1982 9.2 9.0 9.5 7.Ob 6.8 7.2
1977 10.9 10.7 11.3 8.2b 8.0 8.4
1966 NA NA NA 7.3 7.2 7.6
1957 7.1 NA 7.3 NA NA NA
aNon-bank affiliate employment as per cent of total U.S. private sector
non-agricultural employment
bincluding minority—owned bank affiliates
Source: Appendix Tables U—i and U-6
Relative to private non—agricultural employment in the U.S. , employment in
U.S. affiliates grew by more than half between 1957 and 1977, and the same was
true for nonfinancial affiliate employment relative to employment outsde of
finance in the U.S. For majority-owned affiliates (the only ones for which
figures are available for 1966), there was a relative increase between 1966
and 1977. Between 1977 and 1986, all measures of overseas employment declined
relative to U.S. employment. The decline was a major one, almost 30 per cent
for all non—bank and non—financial affiliates and more than 15 per cent even
between 1982 and 1986.
The sector that has received most attention in the United States, manu-
facturing: underwent a much greater increase in the extent of inter-
nationalization in the 20 years ending in 1977 than did the rest of U.S.
industry. Overseas employment reached a quarter of domestic employment, as
— 17 —
compared with a little over 10 per cent for all industries. The relative
decline was then much smaller in manufacturing, as can be seen below——a little
over 10 per cent after 1977 and 7 to 9 per cent after 1982.
Employment in U.S. Manufacturing Affiliates Abroad
as Per Cent of U.S. Domestic Manufacturing Employment
Affiliates Classified by Industry of
Affiliate Parent
All Majority-owned
Affiliates Affiliates
1986 22.0 16.4 23.3
1985 22.6 16.6 24.4
1984 22.6 16.7 24.2
1983 22.9 17.4 25.0
1982 23.6 17.9 25.6
1977 24.7 19.2 NA
1966 NA 13.6 NA
1957 9.9 NA NA
Source: Appendix Tables U—i and U-6
The great increase in the degree of internationalization between 1957 and
1977 reflected the rise in the internationalization of the nianufacturing sec-
tor, offset in part by the shift of U.S. employment away from this relatively
internationalized sector. After 1977, the decline in internationalization in
manufacturing was reinforced by a continued decline in the importance of manu-
facturing employment within the U.S.
Employment is not an ideal measure for comparing domestic and overseas
labor input. For one thing, there was a shift toward female and part—time
employment in the U.S. that may not have been matched overseas. If that was
the case, the employment comparison overstates the relative fall in overseas
labor input in direct investment operations as compared with the domestic U.S.
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economy. Aside from the measurement problem, it is hard to know whether the
relative drop in affiliate employment from 1977 to 1982 reflects mainly the
effect of the 1982 recession or is part of a declining trend. The persistence
of the decline through 1986 casts some doubt on the cyclical explanation.
One respect in which the degree of internationalization of U.S. manufac-
turing firms has continued to rise is that exports from overseas affiliates
have increased relative to exports from the United States by the affiliates
parents and by the U.S. as a whole (Lipsey, Blomström and Kravis, 1989). This
measure also has defects as an indicator of internationalization. It has the
advantage that numerator and denominator are in current values, but it also
reflects the changing degree of export orientation of affiliates, parents, and
U.S. firms in general.
The level of employment in manufacturing affiliates, after declining
relative to parent employment from 1977 to 1982 and 1983, rose in 1984,
stayed unchanged in 1985, but fell again in 1986. Thus, there are some signs
in the employment data that manufacturing firms have retreated somewhat from
foreign operations.
While each of these measures of the internationalization of U.S. firms
has serious defects, they are unanimous in indicating that U.S. companies
expanded substantially into international production after 1950, to the point
where employment overseas reached above 10 per cent of employment in the U.S.
(in 1977) and assets of overseas affiliates reached over 15 per cent of cor-
porate assets (in 1977 and 1982) and 20 per cent of assets outside of finance
(in 1977). Since the peak levels were reached, there has been a retreat, in
the sense that overseas employment and investment have declined relative to
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total employment and total corporate assets. How much pulling back there has
been from foreign operations remains uncertain. The drastic decline back to
19505 levels implied by the ratios of investment position to domestic assets
clearly exaggerates the extent of any withdrawal from production and
employment overseas, because U.S. multinationals were, by the end of the
period, carrying such more employment abroad and much higher assets per dollar
of investment position than during the 1950s. It is fair to conclude that
whatever force propelled U.S. firms into foreign production during those years
seems to be much weakened.
Germany
For no other country do i'e have the same degree of information about
direct foreign investment as for the U.S. Most countries rely for theirS data
on cumulations over time of investment flows or permissions to invest or on
voluntary or other incomplete surveys, often inconsistent in coverage and
methods to a much greater degree than the U.S. surveys. Despite these defi-
ciencies of the data, we can usually extract some indication from them of the
direction and extent of internationalization.
The longest German series is for the stock of direct investment relative
to total assets of enterprises (Table 2). It is subject to the severe
limitations of investment stock measures mentioned above. From 1965 through
1984, it shows a quintupling of the importance of direct investment abroad, an
increase that is uninterrupted in the years for which we have data, before
slight declines in 1985 and 1986. For the period after 1976, through 1985 or
1986, we have confirmation of this rise in internationalization from two
measures we consider more reliable than the stock of direct investment, the
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aggregate assets of foreign affiliates of German firms, which we compare with
the total assets of German enterprises, and employment, which we compare with
domestic employment in Germany. The asset data show a doubling and the
employment data a rise of about 50 per cent in the degree of internationali-
zation of German firms. The asset data show no year-to—year declines until
1985 and 1986, but the employment data show a decline relative to domestic
employment from 1981 to 1983 and then an increase but with only the last of
the ratios, for 1985 and 1986, exceeding that of 1981. Thus, there is some
indication here of at 1east a slowing in the rate of increase of
internationalization, but only small signs of a reversal such as took place in
the United States. The contrast between the monetary and non-monetary measures
during the 1980s may partly reflect the effects of the fail in the exchange
value of the Deutsche Mark relative to the U.S. dollar, which would tend to
raise the apparent degree of internationalization in terms of assets but not
in terms of employment. The overall picture for Germany is of a rise in the
degree of internationalization of firms that has not so far come to an end.
As far as we can tell from the period after 1976, the use of the direct
investment position rather than total assets of affiliates does not seriously
bias the German internationalization measure as it does that for the U.S.
There was some decline in the ratio of the direct investment position to total
assets of affiliates between 1976 and 1985 but it was a much smaller one than
for U.S. affiliates, as can be seen below.
— 21 —
Germany
Direct Investment Position
as Per Cent of Affiliate Assets
1986 16.6
1985 16.5
1984 16.2
1983 16.0
1982 15.3
1981 15.4
1980 15.3
1979 15.6
1978 16.2
1977 17.4
1976 18.6
Source: Appendix Table G-1.
In other words, German parents do not seem to have moved extensively toward
expanding the financing of affiliates from non-parent sources.
The United Kingdom
There has been a trend toward increasing internationalization of non-
financial British companies, if we can believe the only measure available for
the U.K., the ratio of direct investment to the total assets of some
constantly changing universe of domestic firms (Table 3). The universe con-
sists first of panels of listed companies, fixed in composition for five years
at a time. Later it is the much larger universe of what are referred to as
"large corporations" (see Appendix Table UK-4). The degree of inter-
nationalization changed little, if at all, in the early 1960s, after rising
during the late 1950s, but then picked up speed, increasing by about 75 per
cent from 1977 to 1984. Thus, the extent of internationalization grew rapidly
in the 1980s, just when the growth of internationalization appears to have
stopped in the U.S. Furthermore, there were very few cases, within the
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fragments of comparable data, in which the upward trend in U.K. inter-
nationalization was reversed for more than a year.
The contrast between the trend in the U.K. and that in the U.S. in the
early 1980s must be at least partly produced by exchange rate changes. The
rise in the exchange value of the dollar after 1980 reduced the value of the
U.S. investment in Great Britain and increased the value of British investoent
in the U.S. Both countries were major hosts to each others' firms.
This is another case, then, of a clear upward trend in inter-
nationalization. tn contrast to the German case, this one took place in a
country that was losing ground in international trade. Thus, it may be an
example of internationalization driven more by unfavorable conditions for pro-
duction in the home market than by the exceptional competitiveness of the
country's multinational firms.
Particular interest attaches to the progress of internationalization oF
Japanese firms because they have been so successful in international markets
exporting from their home base. They have had, therefore, until recently,
less incentive to move production abroad than firms that were struggling
against the lack of competitiveness of their home countries. Unfortunately,
the data on the overseas operations of Japanese firms are sketchy, depending
heavily on either the cumulation of approvals for foreign investment or on
surveys that are seriously incomplete in coverage and inconsistently
incomplete over time. We suspect that the data on approvals suffer from worse
disadvantages than those from the surveys, and for that reason we have not
used them here, although they are often quoted. One problem is that there is
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no clear connection between amounts approved and amounts actually invested.
The published data on approvals in Bank of Japan (1987) are in U.S. dollars,
and it is not obvious what exchange rates should be used to convert them to
Japanese currency. Furthermore, they take no account of reinvested earnings
of Japanese companies operating abroad. The survey data, which we do use,
apparently cover 51 per cent or less of the universe in terms of numbers of
parent companies and a widely fluctuating, but considerably larger, percent
according to the only quantitative measure we have: the ratio of the book
value of outstanding equity of companies that answered the survey to the value
of equity investment of all companies with approved foreign investment, as
reported by the Ministry of Finance.
Despite all the defects of the Japanese data, there is little doubt that
there was a move toward increased internationalization during most of the
1970s, particularly tbin the corporate sector (Table 4). All the measures
showed some slowing or even reversal of that trend during the late 1970s.
However, the reversals could easily have been an artifact created by the vola-
tility of exchange rates in the case of the financial data and by fluctuations
in the extent of coverage and our crude adjustments for them in the case of
the employment data. During the 1980s, the trend toward increasing inter-
nationalization was resumed, at least in the share of assets held overseas in
the form of direct investment. The increases in internationalization in the
last few years are less convincing than the earlier ones for two reasons. One
reason is that the ratio of foreign to domestic employment hardly changed bet-
ween 1981 and 1984 and was in any case not much greater than the ratios of
1976 and 1977. The second reason is that while the ratio of direct investment
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to corporate assets and national wealth did rise rapidly from 1980 to 1985,
some part of that increase must have reflected the fall in the exchange value
of the yen relative to the U.S. dollar during those years.
On the whole, over the whole period, there is a clear tendency toward
internationalization of Japanese corporations. The shift may have slowed for
several years, but it seems likely, and there is much anecdotal evidence in
that direction, that the rise in the exchange value of the Yen in 1986 and
1987 has given the trend new life, even while it has probably decreased the
nominal value of existing Japanese direct investment.
The Netherlands
Although the Netherlands has been active in direct investment abroad for
a long period, we have been able to make some calculations of inter-
nationalization for only eight years, partly for lack of a good denominator
against which to compare the level of investment. We do have a comparison bet-
ween the direct investment position of the Netherlands and the aggregate
assets of corporations quoted on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, a limited group
with steadily decreasing numbers. For what it is worth, the results agree with
those of most other countries in showing an increase in the ratio:
Netherlands Direct Investment Position as Per Cent
of Assets of Corporations Quoted on the
Amsterdam Stock Exchange
1983 43.3
1982 40.7
1981 40.6
1980 39.4
1979 36.3
1978 35.9
1977 35.9
1976 34.0
Source: Appendix Table N-i
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The increase was not very large, but it was continuous. it is not clear
whether the decline in the number of firms in the denominator produces a bias
in the ratios. If firms were leaving the stock exchange, there would be an
upward bias in the ratios; if they were disappearing by merger with other
stock exchange firms, there would not be such a bias.
Canada
Canada is known much more as a recipient of direct investment than as a
source, but it too has major investors among its firms. For Canada, as for
most of the countries, we have data for a substantial period only for the
direct investment position. When we compare that with the total assets of
Canadian corporations, we find that the latest ratio is substantially above
the earliest, although there is no clear trend (Table 5). The importance of
drect invesrnent, by this measure, fell from a peak in 1970 to a low point in
1976 and the ncreased about 50 per cent by 1985. It did end up considerably
higher than it was twenty years earlier.
The pattern of changes does suggest some exchange rate influences. It
showed a substantial decline in the direct investment share from 1969 and 1970
through 1976, while the price of the Canadian dollar was rising relatively, at
least until 1974. Then there was a large rise through 1985, while the price of
the U.S. dollar increased by about a third.
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Korea
Korea, the only developing country in our sample, has very little direct
investment abroad, as we might expect (Table 6). However, in the very brief
period for which we have data, the degree of internationalization more than
doubled. The increase was considerably more than could be explained by
exchange rate movements and presumably reflects a trend toward more overseas
production by Korean firms.
Table 6
Value of Korean Direct Investment Abroad
as Per Cent of Assets of Korean Corporations
1985 0.71
1984 0.73
1983 0.64
1982 0.51
1981 0.34
1980 0.33
Source: Appendix Tables K—i and K-2
Across the seven countries for which we have found some data, there
seems to have been a fairly general movement toward increasing
internationalization. There are several indicators of this trend. One is the
growth of their foreign direct investment positions relative to the domestic
assets of their corporations. A second is the increase in the proportion of
assets their firms control that is located outside the home countries. And a
third is the rise in the proportion of employment that their firms control
that is outside the home countries.
The exception to these generalizations is the United States. After a
— 27 —
rapid growth in the degree of internationalization until the 1970s, U.S. firms
appear to have drawn back somewhat and reduced their overseas employment and
assets relative to those in the U.S. The extent of any such retreat is
greatly exaggerated by the figures for the direct investment position of the
U.S. but some reduction in foreign relative to domestic activity is indicated
by the more reliable measures.
What can explain the divergent trends in the U.S. and other countries?
One possibility is that the period of World War II and the reconstruction
afterward had opened up a wide gap between U.S. firms and those in other
countries. U.S. firms came out of that period with an accumulation of the
technological and organizational assets that are the basis for a firms abi-
lity to operate in foreign countries. That gap between U.S. and foreign Firms
ncreased the level of foreign operations and the share of foreign operatiois
in their total activity that were optimum for the U.S. firms. They expanded
rapidly to bring their foreign operations up to this level but, having reached
it, slowed down or halted the expansion.
The optimum level of the share of foreign operations in the total may
also have changed over time. If the low technological level of foreign com-
petitors was a reason for the profitability of foreign operations, the reco-
very of foreign firms, even if not fully up to the level, of the U.S. firms,
could at some point have reduced the attraction of foreign production for U.S.
firms. At the same time, it would have raised the optimum level of inter-
nationalization for the foreign firms from the postwar low point, and they
would, in turn, move into production outside their home bases. To examine
such an explanation of changes in internationalization we would need
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observations on levels of internationalization, comparable among countries, as
well as the record of trends.
Recent Levels of Internationalization
Unfortunately, the continuous series we have used to judge trends are
very different in character from country to country. We need some common
measure of country size, even a crude one, against which to compare levels of
internationalization.
One candidate for a country size measure is national wealth, the sum of
tangible assets and net foreign assets. This is a total without duplicatic'n,
in which financial assets owned internally are netted out against financial
liabilities owed to local creditors, and in which holdings of foreign assets
are netted out against foreign liabilities. Another candidate is national
assets, the sum of all tangible and financial assets, domestic and foreign.
it has the drawback of reflecting the extent of Financial intermediation or
layering in the economy but may be thought of as more comparable to the
numerator, since the direct investment asset total in the numerator is gross
rather than net, in the sense that direct investment liabilities and other
foreign liabilities are not netted out against assets as they are in national
wealth. For both of these measures we have Raymond Goldsmith's calculations
on as comparable a basis as possible, including years close to 1977. Of the
seven countries discussed here, five are in Goldsmith's compilation.
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Stock of Stock of Direct Investment
Direct National as Per Cent of National
Investment Assets Wealth Assets Wealth
U.S. (1978) $ billion 146.0 17,887 9,104 .82 1.60
Japan (1977) V trillion 2.88 1,792 894.2 .16 .32
U.K. (1977) £ billion 20.1 1,327.6 617.3 1.51 3.26
Germany (1977) DM billion 51.6 10,172 5,534 .51 .93
Canada (1978) $ C billion 16.4 2,185 970 .75 1.69
Source: Appendix Tables U—2, Col. 3, 3—1, Cal. 1, UK—i, Col. 1, i—I, Cal. 5.
C-i, and Goldsmith (1985), Appendix A, Sum of tangible assets,
Monetary metals, and Net foreign assets.
At this point, close to the peak of the internationalization of U.S.
firms, the shares of direct investment in German and Japanese national wealth
and national assets were only about 60 and 20 per cent respectively of those
in the United States. The Canadian ratios were close to the U.S. levels and
the UK ratios were about twice as high.
For a more 'ecent year, the value of direct investment abroad can be
compared to the stock of domestic plant and equipment for five countries as
fol lows:
Value of Direct Investment Abroad
as Per Cent of Value of Domestic Net Stock
of Plant and Equipment
1985
United States 3.2
U.K. 7.4
Germany 2.7
Japan 1.3
Canada 5.5
Source: OECD (1987), Bank of Japan (1988), and
Appendix Tables U-2, 0-1, UK-i, 3—i, and C-i
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The ordering of the countries is almost the same, but all these ratios are
higher relative to those of the U.S. than the ratios of direct investment to
national wealth and national assets in 1977—Ta. The difference reflects at
least partly the increases in internationalization in countries other than the
U.S. There is also a difference in the measure used.
Of the few countries that collect data on the overseas employment of
their multinationals, the United States has the highest ratio to domestic
employment.
Employment in Foreign Affiliates
as Per Cent of Domestic Employment
1982
United Statas 9.2
Germany 7.1
Japan 2.1
Source: Appendix Tables U-i, U-C, C--I, 0-2, and 3-2.
At least this input into production in foreign countries is much more
important relative to home input for the U.S. and Germany than for Japan, and
somewhat more important for the U.S. than for Germany. Since the ratio of
capital to labor input varies widely among industries, we cannot conclude that
production abroad bears the same relation to production at home as the
employment abroad does to employment at home. For two countries, however, we
can supplement that calculation by a rough measure of capital stocks held
overseas relative to domestic fixed assets.
Assets of Foreign Affiliates as Per Cent
of Value of Domestic Net Stock
of Plant and Equipment, 1982
United States 21.6
Germany 14.9
Source: Tables U-i, 0-1, and OECD (1987)
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The capital input measure and the labor input measure both show the U.S. to
have internationalized the production it controls to a larger degree than
Germany has. The margcns were 30 per cent for employment and 45 per cent for
capital, both considerably greater than the 19 per cent difference for the
value of direct investment. These comparisons suggest that the direct
investment comparisons can be very inaccurate as measures of the amount of
both labor and capital input in controlled operations overseas, that they tend
to greatly understate the extent of such operations, and that the
understatement is larger for the U.S. than for Germany.
We are fairly sure from these data that U.S.-owned producton is more
internationalized than that of Germany, and that both of these countries have
moved much further in this direction than Japan. The relatively low levels of
internationalization of German and Japanese production, especially the latter,
may still reflect to some extent the loss of overseas assets by both countries
as a result of World War It. It may also reflect the fact that both
countries, and especially Japan, have been highly competitive in world
markets, Consequently, there was not until recently a strong force pushing
German and Japanese firms to produce overseas to expand or preserve their
markets. The rise in the value of both countries' currencies relative to the
dollar may provide such a push, but any movement of real production will
initially be obscured by the fact that the value of existing foreign assets,
relative to domestic assets, is reduced by upward currency revaluations.
Lacking data on capital and labor input, we are uncertain as to whether
the high ratios of direct investment to domestic capital in the U.K. and
Canada represent high degrees of internationalization of their production.
— 32 —
The high ratio for the U.K., if we accept it at face value, suggests that
there must be explanations other than the competitiveness of a country's
firms, since U.K. firms are not usually thought of as being the world's
technological or organizational leaders. The high level and continued growth
of the ratio for the UK suggest the effects of home-country conditions: the
low competitiveness and deterioration of the U.K. as a site for production.
Under these circumstances a UK firm possessing firm—specific advantages that
can be used in production abroad may be much more tempted to go abroad than a
Japanese firm with similar firm-specific advantages. The reason is that the
Japanese firm has a home base that, at least until very recently, was a
favorable location For production. Thus the UK case points to the
home-country factors pushing firms out into the world as well as to the
host-country or firm attributes pulling them out.
A difficulty in interpreting the levels of internationalization is that
we have no definition of the optimum level and no theory to explain it. It is
not clear that even with the same firm and country competitive advantages
two countries' firms would reach equal levels of foreign production. It could
be that the smaller the country, the higher the degree of internationalization
it would reach, other things equal. A firm with a technological or other
firm—specific asset might have to go abroad at a much smaller size to exploit
it if it is based in a small country than if it is based in a large country,
as illustrated by Swedenborg's comparison of the size at which U.S. and
Swedish firms began producing outside their home countries (Swedenborg, 1979).
An additional factor in the trends in internationalization that we have
not had time to explore is changes in the industrial composition of output and
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employment. In the U.S. case, the apparent decrease in internationalization
partly reflects the rapid growth of the service industries which, up to now,
have been less international in their operations than manufacturing
industries, although their level of international activity has been
increasing.
The interpretation of all of the monetary measures is affected by the two
offsetting consequences of exchange rate changes. A rise in the exchange value
of a home currency has a statistical effect on the measured level of
internationalization by reducing the value in home currency of foreign asset
holdings, and a home currency depreciation has the opposite effect. However,
the same rise in exchange value that reduces the measured level of
internationalization, if it is a change in real exchange rates, encourages
internationalization by reducing the real cost of foreign assets. The timing
is probably different: the statistical effect is immediate while the economic
effect must take several years since it involves building production
facilities or buying or selling them. Thus, the large rise in the exchange
value of the U.S. dollar from 1980 through early 1985 must have depressed the
nominal measures of u.s. internationalization even while it encouraged U.S.
firms to shift production overseas. The latter effect must have come with
considerable delay, however, and figures for the early 1980s were probably
dominated by the statistical effects of dollar appreciation and the real
effects of the low exchange value of the dollar around 1980.
Summary
Our tentative explanation for the level of and trends in internationali—
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zation in these countries is that country size and changes in both the
competitive advantages of firms and the competitiveness of home countries
played a role. The overseas expansion of U.S. firms in the 1950s and 1960s
reflected mainly their competitiveness, particularly the technological and
organizational gaps that had opened up between U.S. firms and those based in
other countries. The expansion may have been pushed by the growth of markets
outside the United States relative to the U.S. market until the early 1970s,
and also by the increasing overvaluation of the dollar. The combination of
events may have caused the degree of U.S. internationalization to reach a
level that was above the optimum for such a large country.
Eventually, the rise in the competitiveness of European and Japanese com-
panies relative to their U.S. rivals both decreased the attraction of foreign
production for the U.S. companies and increased it for foreign companies. At
the same time, the movement of the exchange value of the dollar to its low
point around 1980, and again after 1985, encouraged production in the U.S. by
U.S.-based firms (reducing their internationalization levels) and by foreign—
owned firms (increasing their internationalization). The same result was
favored by the improvement in the relative growth rate of the U.S. beginning
in the early 1980s. And in the 1980s, the nominal ratios were affected by the
statistical effects mentioned above.
The internationalization ratios for Germany and Japan are so much lower
than that of the U.S., despite their smaller market sizes, that one might
expect continued moves toward internationalization by those countries' firms.
The case for an increase is even stronger For some developing countries, to
judge by the only example we have, Korea, which appears to be roughly where
- 35 —
Japan was in this respect in the early 1970s. The relatively high ratio for
Canada probably reflects mainly the small size of its domestic market,
especially by comparison with the U.S., and the extremely high ratio for the
U.K. may be a consequence of the long period of both low growth and low
competitiveness of the domestic economy.
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Notes to Appendix Table U-i
Sources:
Whichard (1988)
Brereton (1987) and (1986)
U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1986), Tables 11 and 46
U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1985a), Table 6, pp. 13 & 14, Table III.F4
U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1981), Table C, pp. 10—11, Table III.G-2
U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1975), Table 1—21, P. 149, Table K-3, p. 192
U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1960), Tables 17, p. 105, 19, p. 107, and 35, p. 123
a industry of parent, comparable to 1983—86. By industry of affiliate,
from U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1985a), $774,773 million assets and 6,657,000
employees.
bBy industry of parent, comparable to 1982—86. By industry of affiliate,
from U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1981), $494,611 million assets and 7,207,100
employees.
Appendix Table U-2
United States
Measures of Direct Investment Position, 1950—1987
(S million)
All Industries
Non-
financial
Industries
Total Excl. Finance
Affil. in
Neth.
Antilles
Excl. Finance
Affil. in Neth.
Antilles and
Holding Cos.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a
Based on 1982 Survey
308,793 322,293 290,575 244,342
259,562 275,640 247,928 210,573
229,748 250,722 227,947 193,650
211,480 236,520 215,746 182,406
207,203 230,503 210,837 179,741
207,752 227,841 208244 179,417
b
Based on 1977 Survey
221,843 238,309 192,742
228,348 236,081 191,503
215,375 220,177 180,115
187,858 190,522 156,335
162,727 164,116 138,686
145,990 147,206 135,729 120,372
c
Based on 1966 Survey
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
149,848
136,809
124,050
110,078
101,313
89,878
82,760
75,480
68,093
61,907
56,560
51,792
129,521
120,016
109,431
97,447
91,587
81,709
74,976
68,290
61,762
56,520
51,696
47,25249,481
(continued)
Appendix Table U-2 (concluded)
All Industries
Non—
financial
Industries
Total Excl. Finance
Affil. in
Neth.
Antilles
Exci. Finance
Affil. in Neth.
Antilles and
Holding Cos.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
d
Based on 1957 Survey
1956 54,799
1965 49,474
1964 44,480
1963 40,736
1962 37,276
1961 34,717
1960 31,865
1959 29,827
1958 27,409
25,394
1957 1 25,262e 25,151e 24,393e
d
Based on 1950 Survey
1957 26,278
1956 22,505
1955 19,395
1954 17,631
1953 16,253
1952 14,721
1951 12,979
1950 11,788 11,363e
Sources: aScholl (1988) and (1987), and U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1986).
bU.5. Dept. of Commerce (1985c) and 1981), and
Whichard (1983), (1982), (1981), and (1980).
cUS Dept. of Commerce (1982) and (1975) and
Whichard (1979) and (1981).
djjs Dept. of Commerce (1982), except as noted.
eU.S. Dept. of Commerce (1960), Table 21.
Appendix Table U-3
United States
Total Assets of Corporations, 1950—1987
($ Billion)
All
Corporations
Non—Financial
Corporations
BEA and FRB IRS BEA and FRB IRS
1987 13,745.2 4,652.3
1986 12,853.6 4,430.1
1985 11,532.0 4,197.4
1984 10,409.1 3,989.4
1983 9,410.0 10,201.1 3,733.9 4,713.9
1982 8,646.3 9,357.8 3,563.4 4,370.3
1981 8,021.2 8,547.2 3,407.7 4,061.0
1980 7,218.3 7,617.2 3,059.0 3,595.0
1979 6,405.0 6,844.9 2,677.4 3,218.0
1978 5,657.3 6,014.4 2,351.7 2,765.0
1977 4,926.2 5,326.4 2,037.3 2,464.9
1976 4,435.9 4,720.9 1,844.6 2,171.1
1975 4,009.8 4,286.6 1,688.9 1,964.6
1974 3,609.5 4,016.5 1,529.4 1,839.8
1973 3,303.6 3,648.9 1,344.2 1,637.0
1972 2,985.8 3,256.8 1,187.5 1,446.6
1971 2,645.4 2,889.2 1,082.8 1,316.6
1970 2,372.7 2,634.7 989.0 1,233.6
1969 2,192.8 2,445.6 913.1 1,147.5
1968 2,047.7 2,215.6 828.4 1,012.7
1967 1,854.8 2,010.4 748.6 913.1
1966 1,696.7 1,844.8 694.8 837.1
1965 1,592.7 1,723.5 641.8 767.6
1964 1,459.3 1,585.6 591.9 701.7
1963 1,348.0 1,481.2 567.2 655.8
1962 1,253.7 1,388.1 539.2 623.3
1961 1,180.8 1,289.5 515.7 589.6
1960 1,099.7 1,206.7 494.9 556.1
1959 1,049.2 1,136.7 483.5 529.8
1958 987.1 1,064.5 456.2 492.0
1957 919.5 996.4 435.6 467.9
1956 870.5 949.0 411.0 444.4
1955 811.6 888.6 378.3 413.8
1954 740.7 805.3 341.4 372.8
1953 693.2 761.9 326.4 359.9
1952 656.2 721.9 312.1 347.0
1951 611.6 647.5 294.6 330.5
1950 565.2 598.4 269.0 299.7
Notes to Appendix Table U-3
BEA and FRB data are from Appendix Tables U-4 and U-5.
IRS data are from U.S. Treasury Department (1961), (1972), (1977a),
(1977b), (1978), (1980), (1983), (1985) and (1987), and from
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1985) and earlier issues.
Appendix Table U-4
United States
Current Dollar Net Stocks of Fixed Capital, 1950-1987
($ Billion)
______________________________________
Corporate Non-Financa1
Non -
Total Residential
(4) (5)
2,994.5 2,944.1
2,868.5 2,820.8
2,766.5 2,720.0
2,659.8 2,614.9
2,527.0 2,484.1
2,462.9 2,421.7
2,333.6 2,291.6
2,418.6 2,023.6
1,803.9 1,767.2
1,604.5 1,571.0
1,394.9 1,364.6
1,259.3 1,231.7
1,156.2 1,130.4
1,036.8 1,011.9
840.4 817.4
752.6 731.3
696.3 676.1
636.2 618.7
577.2 561.3
522.0 508.3
471.1 459.4
433.0 422.1
392.5 382.7
363.6 354.6
345.0 337.0
332.6 325.2
321.1 314.3
313.2 306.9
304.8 298.7
292.7 287.0
283.7 278.2
263.8 258.3
236.2 230.8
216.8 211.6
207.3 202.2
196.1 191.0
184.1 179.1
166.6 161.9
Sources: Columns 2, 3 and 5: 1984—87, Musgrave (1988);
1950-83, Musgrave (1986a);
Col. 1: Col. 2 + Col. 3. Col. 4: Col. 3 + Col. 5.
Corporate
Non -
Total
(1)
Residential
(2)
Residential
(3)
1987 3,206.2 3,155.8 50.4
1986 3,054.9 3,007.2 47.7
1985 2,927.4 2,880.9 46.5
1984 2,805.4 2,760.5 44.9
1983 2,655.6 2,612.7 42.9
1982 2,584.4 2,543.2 41.2
1981 2,446.3 2,404.3 42.0
1980 2,162.5 2,123.0 39.5
1979 1,890.3 1,853.6 36.7
1978 1,681.1 1,647.6 33.5
1977 1,459.0 1,428.7 30.3
1976 1,315.7 1,288.1 27.6
1975 1,206.3 1,180.5 25.8
1974 1,081.8 1,056.9 24.9
1973 876.2 853.2 23.0
1972 783.3 762.0 21.3
1971 723.9 703.7 20.2
1970 660.3 642.8 17.5
1969 598.6 582.7 15.9
1968 540.8 527.1 13.7
1967 487.1 475.4 11.7
1966 447.2 436.3 10.9
1965 404.9 395.1 9.8
1964 374.5 365.5 9.0
1963 354.7 346.7 8.0
1962 341.5 334.1 7.4
1961 329.2 322.4 6.8
1960 320.8 314.5 6.3
1959 312.0 305.9 6.1
1958 299.3 293.6 5.7
1957 290.0 284.5 5.5
1956 269.7 264.2 5.5
1955 241.3 235.9 5.4
1954 221.2 216.0 5.2
1953 211.4 206.3 5.1
1952 206.1 195.0 5.1
1951 187.9 182.9 5.0
1950 170.0 165.3 4.7
Appendix Table U-5
United States
Total Financial Assets, 1950-1987
(S Billion)
Source: Federal Reserve Board (1988), (1986), (1983), (1981), and (1979).
Col. 1 is the sum of columns 2, 3, and 4.
Total
Nonf i nanc al
Corporate Comm. Private Nonbank
Corporate Business Banking Financial Inst.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1987 10,539.0 1,708.2 2,743.4 6,087.4
1986 9,798.7 1,609.3 2,597.7 5,591.7
1985 8,604.6 1,474.7 2,344.6 4,785.3
1984 7,603.7 1,374.5 2,105.8 4,123.4
1983 6,754.4 1,249.8 1,874.4 3,630.2
1982 6,061.9 1,141.7 1,724.3 3,195.9
1981 5,574.9 1,116.1 1,613.4 2,845.4
1980 5,055.8 1,015.4 1,481.9 2,558.5
1979 4,514.7 910.2 1,355.9 2,248.6
1978 3,976.2 780.7 1,221.0 1,974.5
1977 3,467.2 672.7 1,068.7 1,725.8
1976 3,120.2 612.9 961.3 1,546.0
1975 2,803.5 558.5 885.9 1,359.1
1974 2,527.7 517.5 836.4 1,173.8
1973 2,427.4 526.8 761.3 1,139.3
1972 2,202.5 456.2 663.5 1,082.8
1971 1,921.5 406.7 578.6 936.2
1970 1,712.4 370.3 517.5 824.6
1969 1,594.2 351.8 471.6 770.8
1968 1,506.9 320.1 448.1 738.7
1967 1,367.7 289.2 403.5 675.0
1966 1,249.4 272.7 363.1 613.6
1965 1,187.8 259.1 341.8 586.9
1964 1,084.8 237.3 311.5 536.0
1963 993.3 222.2 285.4 485.7
1962 912.2 206.6 267.5 438.1
1961 851.6 194.6 246.0 411.0
1960 778.9 181.7 228.3 368.9
1959 737.2 178.7 218.6 339.9
1958 687.8 163.5 214.2 310.1
1957 629.5 151.9 199.1 278.5
1956 600.8 147.2 193.4 260.2
1955 570.3 142.1 187.4 240.8
1954 519.5 124.6 182.2 212.7
1953 481.8 119.1 172.6 190.1
1952 456.1 116.0 168.4 171.7
1951 423.7 110.5 159.0 154.2
1950 395.2 102.4 149.6 143.2
Appendix Table U-6
United States
Employees on Payrolls
Private Non—agricultural Establishments
Excl udi
Finance,
ng
Ins.
Total and Real Estate Manufacturing
1987 85,295 78,746 19,065
1986 82,832 76,549 18,965
1985 81,125 75,170 19,260
1984 78,472 72,783 19,378
1983 74,330 68,862 18,434
1982 73,729 68,388 18,781
1981 75,126 69,828 20,170
1980 74,166 69,006 20,285
1979 73,876 68,901 21,040
1978 71,026 66,302 20,505
1977 67,344 62,877 19,682
1976 64,511 60,240 18,997
1975 62,259 58,094 18,323
1974 64,095 59,947 20,077
1973 63,058 59,012 20,154
1972 60,341 56,433 19,151
1971 58,331 54,559 18,623
1970 58,325 54,680 19,367
1969 58,189 54,677 20,167
1968 56,058 52,721 19,781
1967 54,413 51,228 19,447
1966 53,116 50,058 19,214
1965 50,689 47,712 18,062
1964 48,686 45,775 17,274
1963 47,729 44,599 16,995
1962 46,660 43,905 16,853
1961 45,404 42,716 16,326
1960 45,836 43,207 16,796
1959 45,186 42,637 16,675
1958 43,483 41,002 15,945
1957 45,239 42,801 17,174
1956 45,091 42,702 17,243
1955 43,727 41,429 16,882
1954 42,238 40,038 16,314
1953 43,556 41,445 17,549
1952 42,185 40,150 16,632
1951 41,430 39,474 16,393
1950 39,170 37,282 15,241
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1980), (1985b);
(1987), p. S—lU, and (1988), p. 5—10.
Appendix Table G-1
Germany
Measures of Direct Investment Abroad
Assets (Billion OM)
Without Of
Credit Credit Turnover Employ— No. of
Total Direct Investn,erit Insti— Iristi- (Billion ment Enter-
(Million DM) tutions tutions Total DM) (000) prises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1986 149,380 449.8 450.2 900.0 513.2 1,788 15,316
1985 147,453 459.4 431.6 891.1 564.0 1,789 15,132
1984 145,605 453.0 444.8 897.8 522.9 1,597 14,657
1983 123,497 387.5 385.0 772.5 436.1 1,617 14,044
1982 109,234 353.5 360.6 714.2 419.4 1,690 13,618
1981 101,918 3375 325.8 663.3 400.5 1,762 13,084
1980 84,485 281.5 270,4 551.9 325.3 1,743 12,256
1979 70,330 235.5 214.0 449.5 275.3 1,651 11,180
1978 60,767 202.0 173.2 375.2 221.6 1,473 10,335
1977 51,570 167.9 128.4 296.3 189.4 1,248 9,351
1976 48,337 153.9 105.6 259.5 173.0 1,197 8,979
1975 41,992
1974
1973
1972
1971 '
1970
1959 17,618
1968 14,349
1967 12,056
1966 9,996
1965 8,317
1964 7,205
1963 6,071
1962 4,956
1961 3,842
Sources: 1985-1986 Statistische Beihefte zu den Monatsberichten dec Deutschen Bundesbank,
Reihe 3: Nr. 3, March 1988.
1979—1984: Statistische Beihefte zu den Monatsberichten der Deutschen Bundesbank
Reihe 3: Nc. 3, March 1987.
1978: Statistische Beihefte zu den Monatsberichten der Deutschen Bundesbank,
Nr. 2, February 1986.
1976—77: Monatsberjchte der Deutschen Bundesbank, 32, No. 4, April 1980.
1969 and 1975: Kiera (1976).
1961—68 Al-'Ani (1969).
Appendix Table G-2
Germany
Employment in Germany
(Thousands)
(1)
24, 113
23,923
23,650
23,463
23,402
23,782
24, 161
24,335
23,912
23,644
23,459
23,402
23,782
24,202
24,360
24,035
23,633
23,425
23,377
Civilian Non-Agric.
Employment
(3)
23,747
23,483
23,092
22,855
22,813
22,975
23,805
24,247
24,087
24,049
23,907
23,476
22,968
22,823
23,530
23,542
23,295
Col. 1: United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics,
June 1987, p. 12, for year 1980 and August 1988,
p. 12 for year 1981—87.
Col. 2: International Labor Organization, Yearbook of Labor
Statistics, 1986, and 1987, p. 357.
Col. 3: International Labor Organization, Yearbook of Labor
Statistics, 1981, 1980, and 1974, p. 286.
Total Non-Agric.
Employment
(2)
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
Appendix Table G-3
Germany
Enterprise Assets
(Billion OM)
All
Enterprises
Non-financial Enterprises Financial
EnterprisesTotal Assets Fixed Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1986 2,182.5
1985 2,134.7 1,113.3 672.0 933.9
1984 2,063.6 1,085.6 654.7 897.1
1983 1,949.1 1,044.0 631.2 830.3
1982 1,863.4 1,017.8 603.5 773.7
1981
1980a
1,834.5
1,744.05
1,003.7
963.20
589.1
564.22
766.6
728.08
l98Ob 1,685.44 934.92 557.17 708.99
1979 1,582.88 873.75 532.30 672.10
1978 1,466.05 818.55 509.70 612.36
1977 1,381.25 786.36 496.34 560.87
1976 1,330.11 755.02 478.60 544.63
1975 1,222.27 697.25 447.52 494.59
1974 1,186.13 682.29 432.89 477.47
1973 1,134.53 651.01 427.44 461.31
1972 1,056.43 604.35 402.61 431.88
1971 962.38 562.19 371.43 382.62
1970 868.46 507.89 330.32 344.17
1969 773.91 452.44 297.11 306.42
1968 677.72 404.72 272.10 259.32
1967 619.82 386.96 262.56 220.12
1966 619.13 390.77 258.98 214.91
1965 583.72 366.27 239.58 204.64
aThe first figures for 1980 and those from 1981—1986 were originally
published in Systematik der WirtschaftszweiQe des Statistischen
Bundesamtes, Ausgabe 1979.
bThe second figures for 1980 and those from 1965—1979 were originally
published in Systematik der WirtschaftszweiQe des Statistischen
Bundesamtes, Ausgabe 1961.
Sources: Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Nov. 1987, p. 20.
Monatsberichte der Deutschen Bundesbank, Nov. 1986, p. 20;
Nov. 1985, p. 22; Nov. 1984, p. 20; Nov. 1983, p. 22.
"Jahresabschlusse der Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland 1965 bis 1981," Sonderdrucke der Deutschen
Bundesbank, Nr. 5, September 1983.
Appendix Table UK-i
United Kingdom
The Value of Direct Investment Abroad
(f. million)
Private
Nonbank
Public
Excluding Insurance & Property
Cor —
Oil pora-
Total Total Total Companies Other Insurance Property Banks tions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1986a 90,298 84,578 5,720 524
1985 74,366 71,412 2954 466
1984 78,411 77,470 941 534
1983 57,916 56,004 1,912 452
1982 51,779 49,794 1,985 499
i98lb 44,649 42,902 1,747 511
1980C 33,850 31,340 27,840 7,550 20,290 2,420 1080 2,510 NAQ 6.650 2Q 900 1,840
197gm 28,990 27,150 26,350 6,650 19,700 800 NA 1,840
1978e 25,460 24,150 23,420 4.200 19,220 730 " 1310
19'rif 20,097 18,945 18,350 3,550 14,800 595 " 1,152
19769 18,880
19759 15,235
NA
NA
18,000
14,570
3,400
3,400
3,050
14,600
11,520
5
9
g
"
"
"
1,028
710f
47Of
19741 13,320 NA 12,720 2,600 10,120 ' " 600
1973 11,590 NA 10,935 2,250 8,685 ' 655
1972J 10,790 10,110 2,250 7,860 " " 680
1971k 9,290 8,815 2,150 6,665 " " 475
igiok 8,930 8,455 2,050 6,405 " " 475
lg6gk 8,440 7,965 1,900 6,065
" " 475
19681 7,750 7,235 1,650 5,585 515
1967m 7,280 6,785 1,600 5,185 495
1966n 6,285 5,900 1,500 4,400 385
1965
1964° 5,585 5,165 1,275 3,910 400
1963
1962k 4,885 4,510 1,100 3,410 375
aNOv 1987
bSept. 1986 CSept. 1985 djune 1984 ejune 1982: insurance is for investment
in the U.S. only. Property investment is excluded. iune 1980 9june 1979; banks include
insurance and are for investment in U.S. only. hlncluded under Banks. 'June 1977
Jjune 1976 kjune 1974 1june 1973 mjune 1972 '\June 1971 0Sept. 1970.
Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, various issues, as indicated by footnotes.
Appendix Table UK-2
United Kingdom
Net Operating Assets and UK Stake in Overseas Subsidiaries
of U.K. Companies, 1955—1964
(E million)
Oil
Companies
U.K. Stake
Mining, Plantations, and
Manufacturing Total
Net Operating Assets U.K. Stake
1964 1,275 2,141 1,623 3,416
1963 1,170 2,000 1,536 3,170
1962 1,088 1,883 1,453 2,971
1961 1,002 1,807 1,384 2,809
1960 922 1,695 1,310 2,617
1959 840 1,540 1,206 2,380
1958 738 1,464 1,140 2,202
1957 662 1,327 1,057 1,989
1956 572 1,205 962 1,777
1955 NA 1,074 886 NA
Source: Reddaway (1968), Table IV.3
Appendix Table UK-3
United Kingdom
Assets of Large Nonfinancial Corporations
Total
Net Assets
£ Mfl lion
Listed and Unlisted Companies
1985 178,701
1984 179,254
1983 160,111
1982 149,911
1981 140,346
1980 123,200
1979 110,386
1978 99,309
1977 85,580
Listed Companies
1977 52,132
1976 46,917
1975 40,707
1974 35,918
1974 35,676
1973 32,081
1972 27,769
1971 24,428
1970 22,454
1969 21,349
1969 21,745
1968 21,049
1967 20,323
1966 19,872
1965 18,985
1964 17,516
1964 17,087
1963 16,122
1962 15,140
1961 14,221
1960 13,223
1960 13,495
1959 12,409
1958 11,449
1957 10,805
1956 9,988
1955 9,215
Notes to Appendix Table UK-3
1977—83: Listed and unlisted limited companies registered in Great Britain
with a capital employed in the current year of more than
£ 4.16 million, excluding companies whose main activity is
insurance, banking or finance.
1974—77: Fixed panel of companies.
1969-74: Companies with net assets of £ 2 million or more or gross income
of £ 200,000 or more in 1968.
1964-69: Companies with net assets of £ 500,000 or more or gross income of
£ 50,000 or more in 1964.
1960-64: Companies with net assets of £ 500,000 or more or gross income of
£ 50,000 or more in 1960.
1955-60: Includes a few unquoted companies because of their importance.
Sources: 1982-85, UK, Central Statistical Office (1988), Table 17.26
1977-81, UK, Central Statistical Office (1986), Table 17.26
1969—77, UK, Central Statistical Office (1982), Table 17.51
1964-69, UK, Central Statistical Office (1974), Table 384
1960—64, UK, Central Statistical Office (1971), Table 384
1955-60, UK, Central Statistical Office (1966), Table 374
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Appendix Table 3-1
Japan
Measures of Direct Investment Abroad
Overseas
Direct
Investment
Exchange Rates:
Yen per $U.S.
Overseas Direct Invest.
(Yen Bill.) Translated by
Basic Foreign Exchange Basic Foreign Exchange
($U.S. Mill.) Rate Bank Selling Rate Rate Bank Selling Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1987 151 124.05
1986 58,071 185 161.60 10,743.1 9,384.3
1985 43,974 254 201.35 11,169.4 8,854.2
1984 37,921 231 252.05 8,759.8 9,558.0
1983 32,178 237 233.45 7,626.2 7,512.0
1982 28,969 233 236.75 6,749.8 6,858.4
1981 24,506 210 221.10 5,146.3 5,418.3
1980 19,612 242 204.80 4,746.1 4,016.5
1979 17,227 206 241.00 3,548.8 4,151.7
1978 14,329 234 195.40 3,353.0 2,799.9
1977 11,958 308 241.05 3,683.1 2,882.5
1976 10,313 308 293.70 3,176.4 3,028.9
1975 8,322 308 306.15 2,563.2 2,547.8
1974 6,559 308 301.60 2,020.2 1,978.2
1973 4,546 308 281.00 1,400.2 1,277.4
1972 2,574 308 302.50 792.8 778.6
1971 1,851 308 315.70 570.1 584.4
Sources:
Col. 1: Bank of Japan (1988), Table on Assets and Liabilities vis-á-vis
Non-Residents, p. 260, and similar tables in earlier volumes.
Cols. 2 & 3: Ibid., Table on Foreign Exchange Rates, p. 261, and similar
tables in earlier volumes.
Col. 4: Col. 1 x Col. 2
Col. 5: Col. I x Col. 3
Appendix Table 3—2
Japan
Measures of Employment in Overseas Affiliates
and in Japan
Reported
Est. Coverage Ratio
Est.
Employment (000)
AdJ. for
Employment
in Japan,
AnnualNo. of
Employment
(1)
Parents
(2)
Equity
(3)
Coverage Ratio
(4)
Average (000)
(5)
1987 59,110
1986 58,530
1985 58,070
1984 925,754 49.1 (78.8) 1,174.8 57,660
1983 672,607 38.1 57.3 1,173.8 57,330
1982 881,078 45.0 (72.9) 1,208.6 56,380
1981 769,690 39.4 (65.0) 1,184.1 55,810
1980 716,139 43.1 72.1 993.3 55,360
1979 719,090 48.8 85.0 846.1 54,790
1978 725,752 42.7 85.3 850.8 54,080
1977 769,893 50.1 78.1 985.8 53,420
1976 566,124 36.1 55.1 1,027.4 52,710
1975 653,680 50.8 80.4 813.0 52,230
1974 643,738 50.2 78.4 821.1 52,370
1973 52,590
1972 330,926 50.5 72.3 457.7 51,260
Source:
Cols. 1, 2, and 3: MITI data, collected by M. Fujita, except for 1981, 1982,
and 1984 in Col. 3, estimated from Col. 2 by equation V = 8.86 + 1.42X
where Y Percent of Equity covered and X = Percent of Parents covered.
Col. 4: Col. 1 ' Col. 3
Col. 5: Bank of Japan (1988), Table on "Labor Force Survey," p. 301, and
similar tables in earlier volumes.
Appendix Table 3—3
Japan
Measures of National Wealth and Assets
(Yen Billion)
Total National
Total Assets of
Tangible Assets
(1)
Wealth
(2)
Incorporated Business
(3)
1986 2,086,637 2,120,002 655,784
1985 1,817,366 1,850,340 601,955
1984 1,710,557 1,727,731 551,530
1983 1,627,760 1,636,590 525,359
1982 1,570,544 1,576,295 483,057
1981 1,478,895 1,481,189 464,731
1980 1,337,696 1,340,487 429,457
1979 1,160,961 1,166,889 377,730
1978 982,300 990,774 338,799
1977 872,265 879,035 315,654
1976 808,410 811,359 299,517
1975 735,191 737,352 273,762
1974 679,337 682,091 246,630
1973 615,623 619,632 211,209
1972 469,220 473,491 164,610
1971 361,452 364,462 157,605
1970 137,222
1969 115,143
1968 95,856
1967 80,553
1966 67,217
1965 59,677
1964 53,131
1963 44,547
1962 36,067
1961 31,264
Source:
Cols 1 & 2: Bank of Japan (1988), Table on Closing Stocks, Capital
Transactions and Reconciliations of Assets and Liabilities
for the Nation, p. 352, and similar tables in earlier volumes.
Col. 3: Ibid. Table on Financial Statements of Incorporated Business,
p. 276, and similar tables in earlier volumes.
Appendix Table N-i
Net her lands
Foreign Direct Investment Position
Millions of
No. and Assets of Corporations
Quoted on Amsterdam Stock Exch.
No. of
Guilders Companies Assets
(1) (2) (3)
1984 118 311,618
1983 119,886 118 277,100
1982 104,291 118 256,226
1981 99,508 124 245,108
1980 89,685 133 227,751
1979 71,974 136 198,236
1978 60,572 148 168,868
1977 57,805 157 161,170
1976 51,517 168 151,348
1975 53,561
1974 49,622
1973 43,699
Sources:
Col 1: van Niewkerk and Sparling (1985), Table 4, p. 24
Cols. 2 and 3: Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical
Yearbook of the Netherlands,
as follows: 1984:1986, Table 10, p. 151
1983:1986, Table 10, p. 151
1982:1985, Table 9, p. 152
1981:1982, Table 026, p. 270
1980:1981, Table 026, p. 274
1979:1980, Table 026, p. 273
1978:1979, Table 024, p. 266
1977:1978, Table 024, p. 256
1976:1977, Table 023, p. 223
Appendix Table C-i
Canada
Measures of Direct Investment Position and Total Assets of Corporations
Value of Total Assets of
Direct Investment Abroad Canadian Corporations
(Mill. Can. $) (Mill. Can. $)
(1) (2)
1986 56,100
1985 49,909 1,554,287
1984 44,225 1,427,123
1983 37,793 1,309,884
1982 35,558 1,268,732
1981 33,847 1,188,362
1980 26,967 984,151
1979 20,496 845,828
1978 16,422 720,198
1977 13,509 619,716
1976 11,491 546,366
1975 10,526 483,130
1974 9,210 428,101
1973 7,835 360,176
1972 6,715 310,343
1971 6,538 275,311
1970 6,188 250,373
1969 5,211 212,215
1968 4,617 190,115
1967 4,030 172,865
Source: Col. 1, Statistics Canada (1986), and earlier issues.
Col. 2, Statistics Canada (1985), and earlier issues.
Appendix Table K-i
Korea
Measures of Direct Investment Abroad
Overseas Exchange Rate: Overseas
Direct Investment Won per $U.S. Direct Investment
($ U.S. Mill) (Year—end) (Won bill)
(1) (2) (3)
1985 476 890.20 423.7
1984 447 827.40 369.8
1983 386 795.50 307.1
1982 290 748.80 217.1
1981 174 700.50 121.9
1980 142 659.90 93.7
Sources: Col. 1: The Korea Development Bank (1988).
Col. 2: International Monetary Fund (1988), p. 457.
Col. 3: Col. 1 x Col. 2
Appendix Table K-2
Measures of Total Assets of Korean Corporations
Total Assets Exchange
Total Assets Total Assets of Heavy Total Assets Rate Won
(In million (In billion and Chem. of Light per $U.S.
USS) Won) md.
(In bil. Won)
md.
(In bil. Won)
(Year—End)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1985 66,953 59,602 38,282 21,320 890.20
1984 61,395 50,798 32,220 18,579 827.40
1983 59,895 47,646 28,130 19,516 795.50
1982 56,649 42,419 24,856 17,653 748.80
1981 51,769 36,264 21,632 14,632 700.50
1980 42,593 28,107 15,767 12,340 659.90
1979 40,158 19,437 10,748 8,689 484.00
Sources: Col. 1: Col. 2 + Col. 5
Col. 2: Col. 3 + Col. 4
Col. 3 and 4: The Bank of Korea (1986), table on Composite Balance
Sheets of Corporations, pp. 474—476, and similar
tables in earlier issues.
Ccl. 5: International Monetary Fund (1988), p. 457.
